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Socioeconomic segregation is often decried for denying 
poorer children the benefits of positive ‘peer effects’. 
Yet standard, linear-in-means models of peer effects (a) 
implicitly assume that segregation is zero sum, with gains 
and losses to rich and poor perfectly offsetting, and (b) 
rule out theories of ‘social distance’ whereby peer effects 
are strongest among similar pairings. The paper exploits 
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the random assignment of pupils between classes to 
identify more general peer effects in Argentine test-score 
data. Estimates violate both assumptions (a) and (b), and 
provide micro foundations for the correlations between 
school segregation, average test-scores, and test-score 
inequality in municipality-level data.Heterogenous peer e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own.1 Introduction
Should government school systems strive to integrate pupils from dierent
socioeconomic or ethnic backgrounds? The United States Supreme Court
ruled almost sixty years ago that racial segregation will invariably harm
the most disadvantaged and, as a consequence, separate can never be equal
(Coleman 1966). Yet de facto segregation on both racial and socioeconomic
grounds remains widespread in much of the world, the U.S. included. The
large empirical literature on this de facto segregation laments its potential
aect on academic performance. While other channels may connect segre-
gation to test scores { e.g., resource allocation or teaching strategies { the
primary focus in the economic literature has been on peer eects.
Despite this interest in the role of social interactions on pupil perfor-
mance, the standard functional form used to test peer eects renders most
of this literature inherently silent with respect to key questions about the
eect of segregation. First, equations that relate pupil performance to a
linear function of mean peer characteristics are incapable of nding any
relationship between segregation and average performance. Second, the as-
sumption of homogenous eects { i.e., that rich and poor are equally and
symmetrically susceptible to peers' characteristics { may obscure important
asymmetries. For instance, rich peers may exert a strong positive eect on
poor pupils (or vice versa) without the converse being true, as assumed in
homogenous models.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a more general model
of peer eects { abandoning the implicit assumption of homogeneous, lin-
ear eects { can provide micro-foundations that explain the aggregate re-
lationship between socioeconomic segregation and the distribution of test
scores in Argentina. I focus both on the mean and the gap in attainment
between the most-advantaged and the least-advantaged groups. Recent evi-
dence shows that average education quality, though not necessarily quantity,
has a signicant eect on growth rates (Hanushek & Woessmann 2008).
But the distribution of education also matters for growth (Gradstein &
Justman 2002, Judson 1998, Lopez, Thomas & Wang 1998) and, quite cru-
cially { as mechanisms and social objectives themselves { for future income
inequality (Mayer 2002, Jenkins, Micklewright & Schnepf 2008), social co-
hesion (Jenkins et al. 2008, Gradstein & Justman 2000), and democracy
(Castell-Climent 2008). Therefore, the two social objectives in the paper
will be equality in academic attainment and average achievement, without
necessarily prioritizing one over the other.
2Economic segregation can be thought to aect educational attainment
through two distinct channels (Mayer 2002): through the distribution of
resources between schools, and through the composition of students within
schools. In this paper, I use a pupil level data-set for sixth graders in Ar-
gentina to explore the second mechanism. The eect of the composition
of classmates will be identied using the variations across classes within
schools, so that the rst set of factors { related to the political economy of
school nancing, and quality of monitoring and institutions { will be con-
trolled for rather than tested. The identication strategy follows closely
that of Ammermueler and Pischke (2009). The aim is to understand the
impact of increased socioeconomic segregation on both the achievement gap
between poor and non-poor and the average academic achievement of chil-
dren at school. To do this, I need to depart from the standard peer-group
eects approach, allowing for heterogeneity in the eects both in terms of
the socioeconomic background of the recipient student and in terms of the
distribution of socioeconomic characteristics within the classroom.
I nd that, rst, peer eects are indeed heterogenous; wealthier pupils
are more sensitive to peer eects overall. Second, poor children do best
with peers who are richer, but not too rich. This result is consistent with
hypotheses of social distance and competition; people that are too far away
in the social spectrum have lower (or even negative) eects on others (Akerlof
1997). The combined prediction of these two eects implies a strong equity-
eciency tradeo from school integration. Increasing socioeconomic segre-
gation raises both the overall average test score and the gap between the
rich and poor pupils, where the latter is appreciably more sensitive to the
allocation of students than the former.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data em-
ployed and presents basic stylized facts on the relation between test scores
and segregation within provinces and localities. Section 3 presents the stan-
dard approach to estimating peer-group eects and the alternative model
proposed. Section 4 describes the empirical specication and the estimation
strategy chosen. Section 5 and presents the results from the estimations and
the next section the simulations to show the eects of increased segregation
on average test scores and the gap in test scores between the wealthiest and
the poorest groups. Section 7 concludes.
32 Argentina
Argentina is one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America and is well
positioned in terms of educational indicators. In 2000 (the year of the data
used in this paper), per capita GDP was around PPP$ 10;000, the liter-
acy rate was nearly 98%, primary net enrollment was close to 100%, and
secondary school enrolment was just above 80%.1 However, as in much
of Latin America, wealth was distributed extremely unequally and poverty
was far from eradicated. According to ocial gures, the Gini index of per
capita household income circa 2000 was 0.50, 14% of people lived below the
2.5-dollar-a-day poverty line, and 29% below the national poverty line.
In the last couple of decades, the composition of primary school pupils
in Argentina has changed (Llach 2006). Enrolment into primary schooling
has risen signicantly since 1980, particularly among less well-o students,
and drop-out rates have fallen appreciably (Rivas 2010b). Along with these
changes, the quality of education received is much less equal. The dier-
ence in achievement between private and public school pupils has broad-
ened in the areas of the country with weak technical capacities following
the school decentralization process in the early nineties (Galiani, Gertler
& Schargrodsky 2008), and the inequality of achievement remains sizeable
in the poorest provinces (Etchart, Gasparini, Bohorquez, Curia, Ferroni &
Hontakly 2004).2
Disparities in test scores are driven by dierences at three levels: the
school, the class, and the pupil. Schools dier in their physical, human and
`social' resources. Spending per student may greatly vary across schools. As
an example, the private sector in Buenos Aires province spends 30 percent
more per pupil than the public sector (Rivas 2010b). There are also large
disparities between spending in the public sector across provinces { for in-
stance, in 2009 Tierra del Fuego public schools spent ve times more per
pupil than Salta (Rivas 2010b).3 In addition, teacher quality, pedagogy and
1Source: World Development Indicators and Censo Nacional de Poblaci on y Vivienda,
INDEC (2001).
2The ratio between the rst decile and the tenth decile of performance is above four
for the poorest provinces, and only slightly better for the other ones.
3Public schools are mostly funded by the provincial governments (approximately 70% of
the consolidated expenditure in education, Rivas et al 2011). The federal government gives
some restricted resources to specially disadvantage schools and students which can only
be used to pay for infrastructure work, provision of didactic material, support of special
schools initiatives, and training (Fiszbein 1999, p. 11). In a few cases, the local government
may also contribute to the school nancing, through funding special construction work
or extra-curriculum activities (Veleda 2005). Parents contribute voluntarily with a very
4management may vary across schools within and across provinces. Less ex-
perience teachers and school principals are more likely to be placed in schools
with fewer resources and higher proportion of poor children (CIPPEC 2004,
Llach 2006).4 At the class level, the sorting of students across schools will de-
termine the potential pool of classmates (social capital) that children can be
exposed to. Lastly, dierences in performance are due to the students' own
characteristics { such as ability, eort and parental background. Of these
forces, I will focus on the third, that is, the extent to which the composition
of classmates explains dierences in pupils' achievement, by exploiting dif-
ferences within schools across classes. All other dierences will be controlled
for.
The composition of peers { and by extension, the degree of segregation
across schools { is the result of choices made by families and the recipient
schools. Parents choose which school to apply to, and school authorities
choose the pupils they accept, based on their preferences and certain policy
restrictions. These choices may be determined by observed and unobserved
characteristics of all participants.
Students are segmented in a rst stage when choosing between private
and public schools. The ability to pay fees, in a context of scarce schol-
arships, clearly contributes to the disparity in incomes across public and
private schools. In urban Argentina 65% of children in the upper quintile of
the income distribution attended private establishments, while only 7% of
children in the lowest quintile did so.5
Within the pool of public schools, there is still some degree of segregation
of students. According to the 1994 Federal Education Law children should
be allowed to apply to any school, irrespective of their place of residence.
The selection of pupils by the school should be on a rst-come-rst-served
basis, with priority given to children with siblings or parents in the same
small monthly fee to cover repairs and maintenance. Private schools are mainly funded
by fees charged to students and by subsidies from the central government. Subsidies are
in the form of salaries for teachers, and vary between 20% and 100% of the total salary,
the latter mainly in the case of schools run by churches.
4Within the public sector, teachers can choose where to be posted, with priority given
according to a points system based on their tenure, training, and evaluations from school
directors. Some authors have argued that schools with better-o pupils are able to capture
more resources from the State (better infrastructure, more computers and books, better
teachers) because high- and middle-income families can exert greater pressure on the
educational system (Llach 2006, Veleda 2005).
5Source: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2001, carried out by the National Ministry
of Social Development (SIEMPRO). The sample is representative of urban areas with
populations above 5,000 inhabitants across the whole country.
5school. The new regulation represents a change from the previous rules
whereby children were usually given priority by residence, although it for-
mally constitutes a recommendation to the provinces rather than a binding
rule.6 In practice, however, parents still are more likely to send their chil-
dren to the neighbourhood school, and school authorities do manage to
apply some level of discretion in the selection of students on non-reasonable
basis (Fiszbein 1999, Veleda 2003, Veleda 2005). Together, they lead to a
particular composition of students according to their socioeconomic status
and school segmentation within the state system.
Private schools, on the other hand, have several (legal) ways of selecting
students. Family background, psychometric tests, recommendations, or in-
terviews are among the common criteria. Naturally, the ability to pay the fee
as a requirement is in itself enough to determined a relatively homogeneous
composition of students according to their family background.
As mentioned previously, the paper will identify peer eects using the
variation of class composition within schools, across classes, and hence is
robust to endogenous sorting described above.
2.1 Data: `Operativo Nacional de Evaluaci on'
The Operativo Nacional de Evaluaci on (ONE) is a standardized test set up
by the Argentine Ministry of Education in 1993. The test covers Mathe-
matics and Spanish at dierent levels of the educational system, two pe-
riods during primary school and two periods in secondary school. Tests
are multiple-choice, and build on basic knowledge and capacities previously
agreed among all provincial oces. In the year 2000, all schools in the coun-
try were covered by the test. I restrict my analysis to the students of the
sixth grade (approximately 10 years of age) and their test score for Spanish.
All students present at the day of the survey in the chosen class were
tested. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know exactly the proportion
of absentees on that day in each school, so there is a possible bias if, for
instance, teachers suggested students of lower ability not to come on the
day of the test. However, given that the results of the tests are not linked
with remuneration or otherwise, and that the results are only released at
the provincial level (and not to the school), there are no clear incentives for
6Provincial governments maintain autonomy in regards to these matters. Therefore, the
Federal Law can only be interpreted as a `recommendation' from the central government.
In some provinces school choice prevailed before 1994, while other provinces changed the
admission system in response to the law. Still others, notably the City of Buenos Aires,
continue to selects pupils according to neighbourhood of residence.
6the school or teachers to try to alter the results.
Once the test is completed, students are asked about their personal char-
acteristics (gender, age, educational history) and a set of questions related
to their family background. In particular, the questionnaire asks the max-
imum level of education that each parent attained, the possession of more
than a dozen assets, and access to basic infrastructure services. Of these, I
will base most of the analysis to a question on the number of books at home
as a proxy of family socioeconomic status. Among the family background
questions, this is the one with the best response rate. In addition, this vari-
able is highly correlated with parental income and education, and reading
skills in various international surveys (Hanushek & Woessmann 2008, Am-
mermueller & Pischke 2009).
While parental education is generally perceived to be a reasonable mea-
sure of overall family background, I chose to exclude it from the main anal-
ysis because more than a third of the students in the survey did not report
it. This is not unusual in these sorts of surveys; the proportion of missing
values is similar to that in PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Lit-
eracy Study, for developed countries plus others), and in SERCE (Segundo
Estudio Regional Comparativo y Explicativo, for seventeen Latin American
countries). Still, the pupils who have missing values in parental education
tend to come from relative less well-o families (lower number of books at
home, durable assets, and services) and to perform worse than those who
has completed information (in terms of test scores and grade repetition).
For robustness, I will replicate the analysis using parental education and an
index of assets.
Of the total number of schools surveyed, for the purpose of estimation I
exclude schools with only one class per school year. This exclusion allow me
to identify the peer-group eects in a convincing way.7 The resulting sample
includes over 7,000 schools (half of the schools in the country), 20,000 classes
and almost 400,000 students distributed across the country.
Table 2 presents basic summary statistics for all students, according to
the socioeconomic background of the students. The classication is based
on the reported number of books at home, divided in four groups: lower
(ten or less books), lower middle (between 11 and 50 books), upper middle
(between 51 and 100 books) and upper (more than 100 books). More than
7See section 4 for a detailed explanation of the estimation and identication strategy
employed.
7Table 1: Sample sizes and average test scores
Spanish Number of cases
test score Students Classes Schools
All 61.6 574,322
Sample with no missing 62.9 467,304 26,077 13,795
Schools with > 1 class 63.1 389,516 19,662 7,439
Source: ONE 2000, Argentina
Table 2: Students' characteristics, according to own family background.
Own background (no. books)
Total Lower Upper
Lower Middle Middle Upper
(0-10) (11-50) (51-100) (>100)
No. students 399,378 128,321 156,673 60,557 53,827
100.0 32.1 39.2 15.2 13.5
Spanish test score 63.0 55.9 64.2 69.5 69.3
Spanish test score (sd) 19.1 18.2 18.3 18.1 19.0
Maths test scores 59.4 51.9 60.5 65.9 66.1
Parents education (yrs) 10.8 8.8 10.6 12.4 13.5
Assets index (prices) 26.4 20.6 27.2 31.1 32.3
Grade repeated 0.17 0.28 0.14 0.08 0.09
Private school 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.37 0.41
Class size 26.8 25.7 27.0 27.6 27.6
Age 11.6 11.7 11.5 11.4 11.4
Source: ONE 2000, Argentina
a third of the students belong to the lower group and another third to the
lower-middle group.
The proxy chosen for family background performs relatively well; on
average, parental education and assets increase with the number of books
held at home. As expected, wealthier students perform on average better in
both Spanish and Math, are less likely to repeat any grade and the attend
private institutions signicantly more. The gap in test scores between the
lower group and the upper group is 14 points, statistically dierent from
zero and close to one standard deviation in test scores observed in the overall
distribution.
Students tend to share their classes with disproportionately more peers
8from the same socioeconomic group (gure 1). Children from the wealthiest
group have, on average, three times as many peers from the same upper
group than those from the lowest group. And the reverse is also true; pupils
from the lower social background share the classroom with almost three
times as many classmates from the lower group than those in the upper
group. It is precisely the eect of this observed class composition on pupils'
test scores that this paper estimates.
Figure 1: Proportion of classmates in each family background group, ac-
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Source: ONE 2000, Argentina
The following graphs (gure 2) present the unconditional relationship
between economic segregation and average test scores (Spanish), on the left
panel, and gap in test scores between the top and bottom socioeconomic
groups, in the right panel. Socioeconomic segregation is measured here as
the proportion of the total variance in family background that is `explained'
by the variance between schools. At the national level, a third of the overall
disparities in family background are due to dierences across schools. Within
provinces, the degree of segregation varies between 14 percent in Santa Cruz
to 32 percent in Salta (upper panel). Within localities, the proportion of
the variance explained by the variation between schools 
uctuates from 0 to
84 percent (lower panel).
Provinces and localities that are highly segregated report not only a
larger achievement gap between rich and poor pupils, but they also post
higher average test scores overall. The relation appears to be stronger be-
9tween segregation and test score gaps than with test score mean. A one
standard deviation change in the level of segregation raises the locality mean
test scores by .78 points while it will increase the gap between the wealthi-
est and the poorest groups by 2.6 points, i.e. the change in the gap is three
times as large as the change in average test scores. Similar eects are found
using provincial data. The model of peer eects estimated in this paper is
able to account for the observed pattern.
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slope= 22.8 (p-value = .001)
by localities
by province
Note: OLS regressions, with no controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
provincial level. Gap in (Spanish) test scores is the dierence between the average
achievement among the upper group of socioeconomic status and the lower group.
Segregation index is the proportion of between school variance in number of books
over total variance. Source: ONE 2000, Argentina.
103 Beyond linear-in-means peer-group eects
This section brie
y presents the standard approach to estimating peer-group
eects and the alternative formulation proposed which accounts for het-
erogeneity in the eects. The more 
exible structure will turn out to be
important in explaining the stylized facts presented above.
In the context of schools, peer-group eects refer to spill-overs between
students within a classroom that aect student performance. There are
several ways in which the characteristics of others are assumed to aect
a pupil's performance. Interaction with peers that perform well at school
can lead to higher quality of discussion in the class, and faster or better
development of children's knowledge. Conversely, disruptive behavior may
have a negative impact on other students' capacity to learn. Additionally, a
richer classmate can provide alternative role models, access to home tutoring
or technology, and social networks that otherwise the child would not be
exposed to. Furthermore, it is argued that more auent parents are able
to eectively monitor the school and ensure a better provision of education
(Wilson 1997, Mayer 2002).
An alternative view holds that less advantage kids compare themselves
with better o ones and this comparison may lead to `unhappiness, stress and
alienation' (Mayer 2002, p. 155) which will ultimately be detrimental to the
performance of the student (Jencks & Mayer 1990, Runciman 1966). In this
case, the presence of wealthier classmates will have a negative eect of the
pupil's performance at school, while there is no signicant (negative) eect
on the better-o student. In between these two extreme views (positive
eect/role model versus competition/relative deprivation model), Akerlof
presents a model of social distance whereby the strength of the eect of
peers depends on how distant the pupils are in the social spectrum. People
have a tendency to move closer to others { hence those at the bottom move
up, those at the top move down. But the benets from interacting diminishes
as the social distance between them expands. The bulk of evidence of within
school peer eects supports the idea of positive eects from a wealthier and
better performing class. Yet, some recent studies focusing on endogenous
eects (peers attainment) and allowing for heterogeneity nd that good
performers can have a detrimental eect on low achievers (Du
o, Dupas &
Kremer forthcoming, Brown n.d.).
11The general reduced-form specication of an education production func-
tion can be written as
aics = f(Xics;Zcs;X( i)cs) (1)
where aics is the academic achievement of student i attending classroom c
at school s; Xics is a vector of individual and family characteristics, such as
gender, age, ethnicity, family income; and Zcs includes school or classroom-
level variables such as class size, teacher's experience, level of state funding,
among others. The variable of interest here is X( i)cs, a vector of charac-
teristics of classmates of student i, excluding the student, such as students'
performance, parental background, household income, ethnicity or gender.
In the present study, the peer variable will be a proxy of socioeconomic
background.
The standard approach to peer-group eects is to use a linear-in-means
model (Manski 1993). Classmates characteristics X i are included in a lin-
ear regression model using the average level of the variable x within the
classroom. The linear-in-means model is valid under two key assumptions:
(1) that all students are equally sensitive to other people in the classroom;
(2) that the particular composition of the classmates is irrelevant. Both
these assumptions seem to be at odds with the competition/relative depri-
vation and social distance views described above.
Most importantly, the linear-in-means formulation implies by construc-
tion that the precise allocation of children across schools on economic grounds
cannot aect the average achievement in the country; it only may aect the
extent of the gap in achievement among dierent sectors of society. Consid-
ering exclusively within school peer eects, a more segregated society will
lead to a broader dierent in attainment between the worse-o and better-
o students than an integrated one, but the society's average test scores will
be the same.
The present paper generalizes the linear-in-means model to investigate
alternative ways in which class composition may aect performance. First,
I allow for peer eects to be heterogenous across pupils and investigate
whether children from dierent socioeconomic backgrounds are dierently
sensitive to others. Formally, @PEi
@X i 6=
@PEj
@X j, for at least some i;j, where PEi
is the peer eect on student i. Second, the composition eect will weight
dierently each classmates' characteristics, depending on their position in
the distribution of family backgrounds. The idea is that the eect that two
middle-class children have on others might dier from the eect of one rich
12and one poor child, even if the average classroom `wealth' is identical. In
terms of behavior, the idea is that the impact of a terribly wild student might
be more disruptive than two moderately attentive, even if the disruptive
pupil is compensated by an extremely studious companion. In other words,
composition eects permit that @PEi
@xj 6= @PEi
@xk , for at least some j;k.
The approach followed in this paper is related to that of Hoxby (2000).
The paper estimates the eect of increasing the proportion of children from
the dierent ethnic groups on the same and other ethnic groups' test scores.
In short, she nds that raising the proportion of black (Hispanic) students
in the class has a negative eect on all students but that this negative eect
is felt more acutely by other black (Hispanic) students.
4 Estimation strategy and empirical specication
This section explains the specication of the equations to be estimated to
test for the existence of heterogenous and composition eects, rst sepa-
rately, and then combined. The section also describes the strategy used to
address various identication and estimation concerns when estimating peer
eects.
4.1 Specication
The validity of the linea-in-means model depends crucially on two assump-
tions; rst, that all the pupils are equally aected by others' characteristics
and, second, that the marginal eect of peers is linear across the socioeco-
nomic background space. I will estimate peer-group eects using a more

exible formulation, relaxing both these assumptions.
1. Heterogeneous eects: Some people are more receptive than oth-
ers to people's in
uences. A direct way of testing this idea is to permit
heterogenous coecient on the peer-group variable, according to the recip-
ient's socioeconomic group. This is done by interacting class mean family
background with the student's own background. The latter component is
included through an indicator function for the socioeconomic group the stu-
dent belongs to. 8 Specically,
8A similar specication was used in Ammermueller and Pischke (2009). The interaction
eect was found to be positive and signicant for two of the six European countries under
study.
13aics =  +
G X
gi=1
g  gi  Y( i)cs + 
  Xi + s + ics; (2)
where gi indicates the social group g of student i, gi = f1;::Gg, and Y( i)cs
is the average peer family background, excluding i. I also include a vector
Xi of individual and class characteristics (gender, grade repeater, class size),
and school xed eects s. i is the unobserved individual term.
It should be noted that the variable used to proxy socioeconomic sta-
tus (number of books) is ordinal rather than a continuous. Averaging out
the ordinal variable can be contested, as a poor indicator of books held by
classmates' families. Yet, this is the approach generally taken in the litera-
ture (for instance, Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009). Although categorical,
ordinality ensures that increasing values of this average does correspond to
higher socioeconomic level of classmates, even when the cardinal dierences
between means are not precise. I will thus present results using the class
average to serve as a benchmark, and show whether the eects of this av-
erage dier depending of the family background of the recipient students.
The nal regression, combining heterogenous and composition eects, will
replace the peer mean with a set of variables that do not attach cardinal
meaning to the index.
2. Composition eects: The second relaxation of the classic assump-
tion involves allowing for the marginal eect of peers on student i to dier
depending on their position in the distribution. Using the average charac-
teristics of peer implies that all classmates have the same marginal eect on
i. Instead, I estimate peer-group eects using three variables representing
the proportion of classmates in each socioeconomic group. The baseline cat-
egory is `lower group' and the included categories are `lower middle', `upper
middle', and `upper' groups.
aics =  +
G X
gc=2
g  (Prop in gc) + 
  Xi + s + ics; (3)
where Prop in gc is the proportion of peers in group gc = f2;:::Gg. Be-
cause the original variable of socioeconomic background is ordinal, strictly
speaking I will not be testing for linearity. Instead, I will focus on the mono-
tonicity of the relationship, i.e. as more peers belong to higher categories,
the eect should be larger.
143. Heterogenous composition eects: Most likely both eects are at
work simultaneously. Students are dierently receptive to others, depending
on both their own social group and that of the peers. For instance, it is
possible that pupils are more sensitive to changes in classmates that are
socially closer than to those socially very distant to them. The simplest
way to allow for heterogeneity in class composition eects is to estimate
regression (3) separately for each socioeconomic group { as in Hoxby (2000).
The baseline category is the proportion of peers in the same group as the
student.9
aics(g = 1) = 1 +
G X
gc=1;gc6=1
g1  (Prop in gc) + 
1  Xi + s + ics(4)
aics(g = 2) = 2 +
G X
gc=1;gc6=2
g2  (Prop in gc) + 
2  Xi + s + ics(5)
aics(g = 3) = 3 +
G X
gc=1;gc6=3
g3  (Prop in gc) + 
3  Xi + s + ics(6)
aics(g = 4) = 4 +
G X
gc=1;gc6=4
g4  (Prop in gc) + 
4  Xi + s + ics(7)
Estimating equations (4)-(7) form the core of the analysis. The het-
erogenous composition eects will enable me to explain the relation between
segregation and both the mean and the gap in test scores seen in gure 2.
4.2 Identication and estimation concerns
The literature on peer-group eects has paid careful attention to two key
selection issues that hinder the identication of peer eects (Soetevent 2006).
9To compare coecients across regressions I estimate the model in a single regression;
this is useful for the simulations in section 5. The implication is that we are forcing the non-
 coecients to be common for all groups. The baseline category used is the combination
of the student coming from the lower middle group (the most populous group), and the
proportion of peers in the lowest group.





g  gi  (Prop in gc) + 
  Xi + s + ics:
15I will describe these concerns and explain the strategy followed in the paper
to address them.
Given the relative parsimony of the empirical models, the estimates of the
parameters in (2) to (7) might suer from omitted variable bias due to the
failure to control for numerous student and school characteristic correlated
with the peer variables.
A rst concern is related to the selection of children into schools. Parental
choices of school are endogenous to the quality of education provided. The
concern is that peer-group eects may simply re
ect a tendency for eager
parents to send brighter children to high-achieving schools with, say, wealth-
ier peers and better principals. Or similarly, that well performing schools
accept brighter students which are disproportionately represented in better
o socioeconomic groups. Ignoring the selection problem can lead to large
overestimation of the coecients accompanying the peer-group variables.
The approach followed in this paper is to include school xed eects in the
estimation (Hanushek, Kain, Markman & Rivkin 2003), and thus control for
time-invariant characteristics at the school level. In as much as the parents'
selection of school due to reputation is common across all children that at-
tend a particular school, the school xed eect component is also able to
individual unobserved characteristics that are common across pupils and
aect test scores.
It should be clear that with the inclusion of school xed eects, econo-
metric identication of peer eects relies on the existence of perturbations
in the composition of students across classes within schools. As expected,
these variations are small relative to the overall variation across schools,
which makes the identication more demanding, but also more reliable.10
To give a sense of the consequences of using school xed eects, Table 17 in
the appendix presents the estimated values of the coecient on the mean
books index using OLS and school xed eects. While in both cases positive
and signicant, the xed eect coecient is a quarter of the OLS estimate.
This dierence is similar to the one that Ammermueller and Pischke (2009)
found for the average of six European countries. If the xed eects esti-
mation were correct, this would point to a large overestimation of the OLS
results. Interestingly enough, while the peer eect is much reduced, it is
10Other ways to address the problem of selection (not available with the current data) in-
clude: model of selection of schools with Heckman's classic selection correction (Ioannides
& Zabel 2003, Ginther, Haveman & Wolfe 2000, Kingdon 1996, Kingdon 2006), individual
xed eects estimation with partial treatment of members of groups (Mott 2001) and
instrumental variable estimation (Evans, Oates & Schwab 1992, Rivkin 2001).
16still twice as large as the coecient on own family background. This means
that raising the average background of the peers has twice the eect on a
student's test score as increasing his own socioeconomic background.
School xed eects, however, cannot address all sources of bias. Appar-
ent peer eects may still be driven by dierences in the quality of instruction
or school management across classes, whenever these dierences are corre-
lated with the peer variables. This concern would arise if, for instance, richer
parents are able to exert pressure on the school for a better teacher or if
the school tracks children according to their performance. In other words,
there is the concern of selection of students into classes. In terms of the
previous equation, the problem stems from the correlation between bcs and
peer characteristics Ycs( i).
To address these concerns, I exploit random variation in peer-groups
between sixth-grade classrooms within schools. Two-thirds of the pupils in
Argentina attend schools that have more than one class in each grade. The
assignation of pupils to a class is determined at the beginning of primary
school (at six to seven years of age) and remains unchanged throughout
the whole seven years of education. Also, unlike the United States or the
United Kingdom, in Argentina children are not streamed on the basis of
their performance year by year. Instead, the initial allocation of classes is
done randomly and it remains xed for the entirety of primary education.
In other words, bcs and peer characteristics are not systematically related.
Combined with school xed eects, the eect of the peers on a student's
performance is identied by the existence of variations in class composition
across classes within a given school.
The strategy of combining school xed eects when there is a random
assignment of students across classes has been used in a number of papers.
Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) follow a similar approach for estimating
peer eects using PIRLS data of primary school children across six Euro-
pean countries. McEwan (2003) also bases his estimates of peer eects in
Chilean secondary schools using school xed eects, although the argument
of randomization tends to be weaker at the secondary level, given that a frac-
tion of all school aged children do attend this level. Vigdor and Nechyba
(2004, 2006) take advantage of randomization in primary schools in North
Carolina to estimate peer eects for fth graders. In all of these cases,
however, the peer eects were estimated using the mean of the peer charac-
teristics and no composition or heterogenous peer eects were allowed.11 My
approach is also close to Hoxby (2000) who estimates non linear peer eects
11Ammermueller and Pischke also cast doubts on the validity of the random assignment
17with school xed eects, exploiting the variation across cohorts instead of
across classes in the same cohort. Yet, she is interested in the eect of peers
according to their gender and race instead of socioeconomic background.
The randomization of students across classes within the school is the key
element of the estimation strategy. The identifying assumption used is that
students share unobserved characteristics at the school level, but not at the
level of the classroom. It is not possible to test the randomization directly,
but I can test whether the division of observed characteristics across classes
in a school deviates signicantly from what random assignment would yield.
The procedure employed is similar to that used in Ammermueller and Pis-
chke (2009). Firstly, I test for the independence of assignment of pupils based
on their socioeconomic characteristics using Pearson's chi-squared tests, for
each of the schools that have more than one class. As shown in table 3,
in more than 87 percent of the schools one cannot reject the hypothesis of
independence at ve percent signicance level for number of books, and in
94 percent of the schools for parental education. In other words, the evi-
dence is consistent with the absence of a systematic assignation of pupils to
classes on socioeconomic grounds for a great majority of schools.12 Still, I
will estimate all the equations for the complete sample and for a restricted
sample that includes only the schools for which the chi-square test was not
rejected.
An additional concern is that even when the children are randomly al-
located across classes, the school may choose to assign teachers based on
the performance of pupils. For instances, one could imagine that a princi-
pal might choose to allocate the more experienced teacher in a class where
there is likely to be more disruptive behavior. Alternatively, teachers with
in McEwan (2003) and in Vigdor and Nechyba (2004, 2006) for dierent reasons. Sacer-
dote et al. (2001) is also in a similar vein, exploiting the random assignment of college
students to dorms. Related approaches are used by Du
o and Saez (2003), Du
o et al.
(forthcoming), Du
o et al. (forthcoming) and Miguel and Kremer (2004) all of which use
partial population experiments with random assignment of treatment.
12There is, instead, evidence consistent with the idea that children are allocated across
classes within a school based on their age. This resonates with what teachers and princi-
pals say in informal conversations with respect to class formation in kindergarten which
may carry out onto primary school. Evidence from OECD countries suggests that ini-
tial maturity dierences can have long-lasting eects on students performance (Bedard &
Dhuey 2006) so that even in sixth grade there might be a signicant dierence in children
test scores due to the age dierence. If the allocation of pupils is aected by age there
could be correlated eects that could overestimate the peer eect coecients. Thus, the
regressions will control for the age of the student, even though the variable is expressed
in years rather than months.
18Table 3: Tests for independence of peer variables and class assignment and
classroom resources (following AP2009).
Family Chi-square test Teacher's characteristics









Note: The rst column corresponds to the proportion of schools for which the
Pearson's 2 test cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence between the
number of books (parental education) and class assigned within the school. The
second column of the table reports the p-value of a joint test from a regression of
number of books (parental education in years) on a set of teachers' characteristics.
These include teachers' gender, degree obtained and years of experience. Source:
ONE 2000, Argentina.
more tenure in a school might be able to in
uence their assignation into
classes based on, for instance, past performance of pupils so that the more
experienced teacher is met with the best performing class. If this were the
case, the estimates of the peer eects will be biased. Once again, I follow
Ammermueller and Pischke to test this by regressing children socioeconomic
characteristics (number of books and years of parental education) on a set
of teachers' characteristics, with school xed eects. The explanatory vari-
ables included in the model are teachers' gender, degree obtained and years
of experience. The p-values of the F-test of joint signicance is reported in
the right side of table 4. In all cases, there is no evidence of allocation of
teachers based on students' characteristics.
A separate issue worth mentioning is the well-known problem of identi-
fying separately endogenous and exogenous eects. This concern is known
in the literature of social interactions as the re
ection problem and has been
introduced in the area by Manski (1993). The standard formulation of peer
eects is a linear-in-means model, where the student's achievement is deter-
mined by the average classmates' achievement and average predetermined
characteristics. The estimated coecient on the rst term denes the en-
dogenous peer eect and the coecient on the second is the contextual eect.
19The re
ection problem is the inability to separate these two eects due to
the fact that there is a feedback loop in the endogenous variables. A great
number of papers have proposed alternative methods to tackle the re
ec-
tion problem and identify separately endogenous and exogenous peer-group
eects.13 My approach here is, instead, to remain agnostic about which
of these eects drives my results. Rather than estimating the endogenous
and the contextual eects separately, my purpose is to estimate the reduced
form equation, where the peer eects is often referred to as the general so-
cial eects (Mott 2001). For the purpose at hand { the study the eect of
increase segregation{ estimating general social eects using a reduced form
is sucient.14
Finally, standard errors are clustered at the school level to adjust for
intra-school correlation, and are robust to heteroscedasticity.
5 Results
In this section I test the existence of heterogenous eects { dierences in
the impact of peers according to socioeconomic background of the recipient
student { and composition eects of the peer-group eects { dierences in
the proportion of classmates in each socioeconomic group. I then estimate
the combined eect of both these forces. The next section will show how
these parameters may explain the relation in aggregate data from gure 2.
Table 4 presents regressions of the standard peer-group eects using the
mean classmates' books index (columns 1 and 3) and combined with the
socioeconomic group of the recipient student (columns 2 and 4) on student's
test scores in Spanish. The last two regressions correspond to the `restricted
sample' which includes only the schools for which the test of independence
of peer variables across classes cannot be rejected.
The mean family background of peers (Class mean SES) has a positive
and signicant eect on a pupil's test scores. Increasing the average socioe-
conomic status of peers by one standard deviation (.52) raises the pupil's
13Manski (1993) suggest to nd a variable that aects the achievement but not the
contextual eect; Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002) use a binary or multinomial choice
model; Katz et al. (2001) take advantage of group-changing intervention in the Boston
area; and again Katz et al. (2001) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001) employ instrumental
variables.
14\To the extent, therefore, that it does not matter for the purpose at hand whether
social interactions are of the endogenous or exogenous type, estimation of the reduced
form equations (...) is sucient" (Mott 2001, 57).
20test score by one and a half points. Column 2 shows that this eect is
not constant across the level of education of the recipient student. (A for-
mal test of equality of coecients can be found in the appendix, table 13).
Wealthier pupils are more sensitive to the background of their peers. One
implication of this result is that children from more disadvantaged origins
(Li;LMi) not only perform worse than wealthier students (UMi;Ui) due to
their own socioeconomic background, but also they lose out in the social in-
teraction game, unable to benet as much from the positive externalities of
having wealthy peers. These results also point to the possibility that when
rich and poor pupils interact, the losses incurred by the former are greater
than the gains to the latter. All in all, the heterogeneity of the peer-group
eect calls into question the validity of the standard, linear-in-means model
of estimating the impact of social interactions.
Table 4: Test of heterogenous peer-group eects
Dependent vle: Test score in Spanish
All Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Class mean SES 2.814 2.133
(.254) (.297)
Class mean SES * Li 1.246 .553
(.293) (.333)
Class mean SES * LMi 2.923 2.279
(.263) (.304)
Class mean SES * UMi 3.744 3.108
(.277) (.321)
Class mean SES * Ui 5.332 4.694
(.287) (.329)
Obs. 389,513 389,513 333,276 333,276
e(N-g) 7,444 7,444 6,463 6,463
R2 .068 .069 .066 .068
Test di coecients X X
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables
included in the regressions are the student's number of books at home, gender,
repeat, class size and age. ONE, 2000. Argentina.
The next set of results (table 5) estimates equation (3) to examine
whether the in
uence of the peers on a student's performance is mono-
tonically increasing and linear. The evidence is consistent with the idea
21that raising the proportion of wealthier classmates (while reducing that of
the lower group), increases the test score of the average pupil. Contrary to
what could be expected, the largest eect comes from increasing the pres-
ence of children from the upper-middle group, and not the upper group.
This points to a non-linear relationship between peers' family background
and student's performance at school. The dierent between the coecients
on the two upper groups (.090 versus .067) is statistically dierent at an 0.6
percent level. See table 15 in the appendix.
Table 5: Class composition eect
Dependent vle: Test scores in Spanish
(1) (2)
Prop peers in LM .052 .044
(.006) (.007)
Prop peers in UM .091 .082
(.008) (.009)
Prop peers in U .068 .047
(.008) (.009)




Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables
included in the regressions are the student's number of books at home, gender,
repeat, class size and age. Source: ONE, 2000. Argentina
At worst, the results indicate that there is no gain from having peers
from the wealthiest group. At best, they suggest that it is preferable to
integrate students from lower socioeconomic background with others from
upper-middle class children than with those from the top of the distribu-
tion. In both cases, the conclusion of non-monotonicity of peer-group eects
remain. In other words, the specic conformation of the class in terms of
the socioeconomic background of the students matters for the total eect on
test scores. These coecients estimate eect, however, for the average child.
It might very well be that class composition have dierent eects depending
on the parental background of the recipient student. I do this in the next
table.
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimation of four regressions { equations
22(4) to (7) { one for each socioeconomic group of the recipient student. The
baseline category is the proportion of peers from the same the socioeconomic
group. All the estimated coecients should be interpreted in reference to
this category in each column.15
Table 6: Heterogeneous eects of class compositions
Dependent vle: Test score in Spanish
Lower Lower Middle Upper middle Upper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop peers in L -.060 -.121 -.115
(.007) (.014) (.016)
Prop peers in LM .049 -.064 -.052
(.008) (.012) (.013)
Prop peers in UM .079 .025 .017
(.013) (.009) (.014)
Prop peers in U .024 .008 -.049
(.014) (.009) (.014)
Obs. 125,204 152,756 59,056 52,485
e(N-g) 7,225 7,414 6,973 6,735
R2 .048 .061 .068 .063
Test LM-UM (p-value) .018
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables
included in the regressions are the student's number of books at home, gender,
repeat, class size and age. Source: ONE, 2000. Argentina
From these tables three features emerge: (1) from the point of view of
the two lowest groups, there is little or no benet from mixing with the
wealthiest students; (2) as previously noted, the upper-middle group has
the strongest eects on others, including themselves; (3) the upper group
is statistically indierent between being with peers of their own group or
the upper-middle one. The implication of these results is that mixing chil-
dren from dierent socioeconomic groups, especially lower and upper-middle
categories, will help narrow the gaps in performance observed while the ef-
fect on the average test score is unclear. These results are reminiscent of
the social distance model discussed earlier. Students at the bottom of the
distribution perform better when surrounded by others from higher social
groups, while those above perform worse, hence approaching one another.
15I also include in the appendix a single regression (Table 17) using interaction terms,
which will be used in the simulations in the next section.
23Table 7: Heterogeneous eects of class compositions. Restricted Sample
Dependent vle: Test score in Spanish
Lower Lower Middle Upper middle Upper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop peers in L -.055 -.114 -.098
(.009) (.017) (.019)
Prop peers in LM .039 -.077 -.044
(.009) (.014) (.015)
Prop peers in UM .073 .020 .020
(.015) (.011) (.016)
Prop peers in U -.002 -1.12e-06 -.062
(.016) (.011) (.016)
Obs. 107,523 130,721 50,303 44,720
e(N-g) 6,274 6,444 6,052 5,846
R2 .047 .06 .068 .06
Test LM-UM (p-value) .021
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables
included in the regressions are the student's number of books at home, gender,
repeat, class size and age. Source: ONE 2000. Argentina
But the tendency for a child at the bottom to perform better diminishes
when the social distance is too large.
Finally, for robustness I ran the previous three regressions using alterna-
tive denitions of the dependant variable, the main peer variable, and type
of school attended, to see the robustness of results found. The results are
summarized in table 8 with regressions results in the appendix (tables 18 to
21).
One could argue that the rules of randomization across classes are more
relevant in the context of public (state) schools than in private ones. When
registering a new student into a school, principals are not meant to request
information other than date of birth and formal education history of the
child. Private institutions are not subject to such regulation. Indeed, some
private establishments request the candidates to take tests, to provide in-
formation of parents education and occupation, and to include references.
Additional information of candidate's ability and social background can be
use to assign pupils into classes. I therefore run the same analysis exclusively
for public schools. All the previous results hold.
A second set of robustness analysis involves using alternative measures
24of socioeconomic status for the student and peers. First, I use parental edu-
cation, dened as the average between the two parents when information for
both is available. The four socioeconomic groups are dened in relation to
levels attained: incomplete primary, complete primary, complete secondary
and complete tertiary. For the regression testing the existence of heteroge-
neous eects, I compute the average years of education.16 For reference, I
also include in the tables the results using the variable books but only for
observations for which there is also information of parental education. This
is to help distinguish between dierence in results arising from the use of
alternative proxies of socioeconomic status and those from a smaller sam-
ple, given the presence of non-random missing values. The second proxy of
socioeconomic status is based on assets and access to services at home. I
construct an asset index as the rst principal component of a factor analysis.
The boundaries of the socioeconomic groups are such that the distribution
of students is similar to that derived from the number of books, with 60
percent of pupils in the lower two groups.
Table 8: Robustness Analysis
Heterogenous Class composition Combined eects
increasing not strictly monotonic UM largest L-LM vs U UM vs U
Public schools X X X X X
Parental education X X X X X
Assets (PCA) X X (X) X
Math X X X X X
Table 8 summarizes the results; details can be found in the Appendix. In
all cases, the main conclusions remain. Crucially, they imply that increasing
the degree of segregation of children on economic grounds will harm worse o
students test scores while increase the attainment of richer pupils. In other
words, the gap in performance would deteriorate. As mentioned before, the
eect on the average test score is unclear. For this, I now turn to simulations.
16The original variable is expressed in terms of levels attained. I impute years of edu-
cation using data from the Permanent Household Survey (October 2000). For incomplete
level categories, I impute using the median value of the category, by province and gender.
256 Simulations
This last section of the paper uses the estimated coecients from table
6 to compute, for each student, the total test-score gain attributable to
peer eects. The aim is to analyze how the average performance and the
gap between the poorest and the wealthiest group change as the degree of
segregation varies. The change in mean test score will depend on whether
the losses incurred by poor students are compensated by the gains accruing
to the rich. Two elements are key: (1) the coecients on peer variables for
each group, and (2) the proportion of students in each socioeconomic group
in the whole distribution. I will construct a (ctitious) sample of students
which have the same proportion of pupils in each category of socioeconomic
status as found in Argentina. Each student is then assigned randomly to
a school of size equal to the median class size in the country (27). In the
present exercise, each school has only one class. For each student, I compute
the proportion of peers belonging to each socioeconomic group that results
from the random assignment.
The random allocation of pupils will determine a specic degree of seg-
regation across schools. I use the same segregation index as in the introduc-
tion, dened as the proportion of the total variance in number of schools
that is `explained' by the variance between schools. This particular degree
segregation will be associated with a certain average gain in test scores from
peers, and a gap between the average gain for the wealthiest group (upper)
and the average gain for the poorest one (lower). I repeat this exercise re-
allocating students into schools randomly, and computing once again the
degree of segregation, the average gain in test score and the average gap in
the gains. I do this fty times, enough to have a sucient spread in the
segregation index. The results are presented in gure 3 and table 9. The
vertical lines in the graph are used as reference and indicate the lowest and
highest degree of segregation found in the Argentine provinces. Because
these results are dependent on the original distribution of socioeconomic
characteristics of pupils, I also repeated the same exercise for two other dis-
tributions, one corresponding to one of the richest districts in the country,
the City of Buenos Aires, and a second for one of the poorest provinces,
Santiago del Estero.
Two main features emerge from these graphs. First, as the degree of
segregation across schools increases both the average and the gap in test
scores rise. This means that, at least in Argentina, there is a trade-o
between eciency (increasing the mean) and equity (decreasing the gap).
Second, the rate at which the gap increases is much larger in the case of
26Table 9: Simulated peer eects on test scores in Spanish
Full integregation Actual level Full segregation
National distribution
(32, 39, 15, 14)
mean L 1.25 0.73 -1.15
mean LM 4.83 5.00 6.45
mean UM 6.27 7.44 12.85
mean U 4.61 6.67 10.83
overall mean 3.86 4.21 5.55
gap U - L 3.4 5.9 12.0
City of Buenos Aires distribution
(12, 36, 25, 27)
overall mean 6.70 6.96 8.26
gap U - L 5.7 7.2 12.0
Santiago del Estero
(48, 34, 10, 8)
overall mean 2.23 2.53 3.79
gap U - L 1.9 4.5 12.0
Note: Figures in the table represent the marginal eect of peers' background on
pupil test scores at various levels of socioeconomic segregation. The eects are
calculated using the parameters from table in the appendix. As an example the
upper-left cell shows that with full integration a pupil from the lowest socioeconomic
group will receive a positive test score gain of 1.25 through peer eects, whereas
with full segregation she or he will suer a loss of 1.15 points.
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Note: The vertical lines indicate the degree of segregation found in each case.
the gap than for the average test scores. In other words, the equity aspect
is signicantly more sensitive to changes in the allocation of students on
the basis of socioeconomic status than the mean is. Both these results are
consistent with the pattern observed across localities in the introduction.
Indeed, peer eects alone can account for, at least the sign of the relationship
observed in the date. The variation across schools (with dierent human,
social and physical resources and management) most likely works in the same
direction, strengthening the results. Still, even disregarding the (certainly
sizeable) dierences across schools, there is a trade-o between gap and
mean test scores that is entirely due to the eects that peers have on other
pupils.
7 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has argued that the standard, linear-in-means approach to es-
timating peer-group eects does not fully account for the consequences of
economic segregation. After relaxing two assumptions of the linear-in-means
model, I nd that wealthier pupils are more sensitive to peer eects. Sec-
ond, there is evidence that peer eects are non-monotonic, such that the
composition of classmates' backgrounds { rather than simply their mean
{ matters for test scores. Estimates using a more 
exible functional form
reveal a pattern that is consistent with the hypothesis of social distance.
28When the social gap between two individuals becomes too wide, the posi-
tive externalities for the poorer individual disappear.
My results show that social interactions matter. While this is not the
rst paper to nd signicant peer eects, this paper adds to a small set
of studies that can identify causal peer eects that are not contaminated
by endogenous sorting of pupils between schools. The size and signicance
of these estimates in a developing-country school system have important
implications for social policy. Segregation exerts an eect on pupils through
peer eects that cannot be overcome by equalizing school funding, pupil-
teacher ratios or syllabi. In that sense my results give concrete meaning
to the U.S. Supreme Court's dictum in 1954 that separate is inherently
unequal.
The results also show that segregation is not a zero sum game, but may
have aggregate consequences. The functional form used in previous analyses
has largely ruled out the possibility of aggregate consequences from segrega-
tion by assumption. Relaxing these assumptions, I nd somewhat troubling
results, pointing to an equity-eciency trade-o, with segregation yielding
higher average scores and much higher inequality in scores between rich and
poor. Nevertheless, the fact that inequality in achievement between rich and
poor pupils appears in the simulation to be much more sensitive than mean
scores to variation socioeconomic segregation may provide a cautionary note
when formulating education policies.
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Table 10: Segregation index
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
by provinces
Segregation index 24 .2384 .0389 .1435 .3261
Number of students 24 25,579 33,453 2,417 154,542
Number of schools 24 594.6 584.4 39 2,378
Number of localities 24 149.6 107.6 3 391
by localities
Segregation index 1,308 .1656 .1211 0 .84
Number of students 3,591 169.4 682.4 2 20,707
Number of schools 3,591 3.9 11.2 1 352
Note: Segregation index is computed for each province (locality) as the variance
of test scores between schools over the total variance in test scores in the province




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 12: School xed eects
Dependent vle: Full sample Restricted sample
Spanish Test scores (1) (2) (3) (4)
Class mean SES 11.053 2.893 11.277 2.178
(.061) (.256) (.159) (.298)
Own SES 1.651 1.330 1.664 1.306
(.031) (.032) (.033) (.035)
Obs. 389,513 389,513 333,276 333,276
e(N-g) 7,444 6,463
R2 .201 .065 .204 .064
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables
included in the regressions are the student's number of books at home, gender,
repeat, class size and age. Source: ONE, 2000. Argentina
Table 13: Test of equality of coecients, heterogenous eects (from Table
4, column (2)
p-value F(2, 7468)
L LM UM U L LM UM U
L . 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 50.98 92.95 106.99
LM 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 50.98 . 21.13 42.49
UM 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 92.95 21.13 . 13.50
U 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 106.99 42.49 13.50 .
Table 14: Test of equality of coecients, heterogenous eects (from Table
4, column (4)
p-value F(2, 7468)
L LM UM U L LM UM U
L . 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 87.50 118.98 273.56
LM 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 87.50 . 22.53 154.21
UM 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 118.98 22.53 . 62.57
U 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 273.56 154.21 62.57 .
36Table 15: Test of equality of coecients, composition eects (from Table 5,
column (2)
p-value F(2, 7468)
Prop LM Prop UM Prop U Prop LM Prop UM Prop U
Prop LM . 0.000 0.039 . 26.66 4.26
Prop UM 0.000 . 0.008 26.66 . 7.09
Prop U 0.039 0.008 . 4.26 7.09 .
37Table 16: Heterogeneous eects of class compositions. One regression
hline All Restricted sample
(1) (2)
Li*(Prop peers in L) -.010 -.008
(.003) (.003)
Li*(Prop peers in LM) .024 .014
(.006) (.007)
Li*(Prop peers in UM) .052 .052
(.010) (.012)
Li*(Prop peers in U) .011 -.012
(.011) (.012)
LMi*(Prop peers in L)
LMi*(Prop peers in LM) .067 .059
(.007) (.008)
LMi*(Prop peers in UM) .093 .080
(.008) (.010)
LMi*(Prop peers in U) .073 .057
(.008) (.010)
UMi*(Prop peers in L) .005 .007
(.004) (.004)
UMi*(Prop peers in LM) .077 .068
(.007) (.008)
UMi*(Prop peers in UM) .132 .125
(.009) (.011)
UMi*(Prop peers in U) .095 .075
(.009) (.010)
Ui*(Prop peers in L) -.034 -.035
(.004) (.005)
Ui*(Prop peers in LM) .065 .059
(.007) (.008)
Ui*(Prop peers in UM) .123 .111
(.009) (.011)





Source: ONE, 2000. Argentina. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
school level. Other variables included in the regressions are number of books at

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 19: Class composition eect: Alternative specications
No miss p.edu Public Math PEdu Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prop peers in LM .054 .056 .042 .027 .027
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.006)
Prop peers in UM .094 .096 .073 .043 .055
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.007)
Prop peers in U .073 .071 .062 .031 .063
(.008) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.008)
Obs. 279,531 298,394 395,892 288,288 296,389
e(N-g) 7,439 5,780 7,444 7,441 7,456
R2 .073 .072 .045 .065 .063
Note: `Public' uses number of books and only public schools. `PEdu' uses average
parental education and is grouped as incomplete primary (lower), complete primary
(lower middle), complete secondary (upper middle) and complete tertiary (upper).
`Assets' uses an index constructed as the rst principal component of a set of
variables on durable assets at home and is grouped so that the proportion of pupils
in each group is approximately similar to that in the number of books. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables included in the
regressions are student's own group, gender, repeat, class size and age.
Table 20: Heterogeneous eects of class compositions: Parental education
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper
Prop peers in L -.028 -.054 -.063
(.010) (.011) (.017)
Prop peers in LM .017 -.021 -.041
(.014) (.008) (.011)
Prop peers in UM .017 .010 .007
(.014) (.007) (.011)
Prop peers in U -.010 -.021 -.005
(.018) (.009) (.009)
Obs. 40,039 108,228 86,163 53,858
e(N-g) 6,530 7,318 7,381 6,932
R2 .049 .064 .069 .064
Note: Parental education is the average of both parents when present, and is
grouped as incomplete primary (lower), complete primary (lower middle), com-
plete secondary (upper middle) and complete tertiary (upper). Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables included in the regressions
are student's own group, gender, repeat, class size and age.
41Table 21: Heterogeneous eects of class compositions: Assets' index (PCA)
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper
Prop peers in L -.035 -.077 -.088
(.008) (.010) (.020)
Prop peers in LM .011 -.038 -.011
(.009) (.009) (.013)
Prop peers in UM .025 .029 -.003
(.011) (.009) (.011)
Prop peers in U .037 .048 -.002
(.017) (.011) (.010)
Obs. 75,419 93,332 79,847 47,791
e(N-g) 6,716 7,252 7,128 5,723
R2 .048 .066 .068 .064
Note: `Assets' uses an index constructed as the rst principal component of a set of
variables on durable assets at home, and is grouped so that the proportion of pupils
in each group is approximately similar to that in the number of books. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the school level. Other variables included in the
regressions are student's own group, gender, repeat, class size and age.
42